
Microsoft 365, Security5. Februar 2026
M365 Incident Response Playbooks

Drago Petrovic
Microsoft MVP
This document provides customer-ready incident response playbooks for common Microsoft 365 security incidents. It is designed to accelerate containment, reduce business risk, and ensure consistent, audit-friendly handling.
1) Scope, Licensing Baseline, Prerequisites, and Severity
1.1 Scope (What this covers)
This playbook set covers incidents primarily within Microsoft 365:
- Entra ID (P1/P2): identity, sign-ins, MFA, Conditional Access, risk-based signals
- Defender for Office 365 P2: phishing investigation, Explorer, automated investigation/response (AIR), threat hunting
- Defender for Endpoint: endpoint alerts, device isolation, investigation, remediation
- Microsoft Purview: audit, DLP, sensitivity labels, eDiscovery (where applicable)
- Intune: device compliance, app/device management, remote actions
1.2 Licensing/Tooling Baseline (Assumed Available)
The procedures below assume the customer has: Defender for Office 365 P2, Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Purview, Entra ID P1/P2, and Intune.
Note: If any component is missing, dotCLOUD will provide an adjusted incident path (reduced visibility/containment options).
1.3 Prerequisites (Execution Readiness)
- Named Contacts: IT admin, security lead, legal/compliance, and business owner.
- Access: Administrative access path (break-glass procedure + approval flow).
- Log Retention: Entra sign-in logs, Unified Audit Log / Purview Audit, Defender incident retention.
- Communication Channel: SEV1 (Ticket + Phone/Teams bridge), SEV2/3 (Ticket + scheduled updates).
1.4 Severity Levels (Customer-Facing)
| Level | Definition |
|---|---|
| SEV1 | Active compromise with confirmed data access/exfiltration, privileged account impact, or business interruption. |
| SEV2 | Likely compromise or high-confidence malicious activity, limited scope, no confirmed exfiltration. |
| SEV3 | Suspicious indicators, contained quickly, low impact. |
1.5 Customer Decision Points (Important)
- Is tenant-wide containment acceptable (external sharing restrictions, mail flow blocks) vs. user-scoped actions?
- Evidence preservation priority (regulated) vs. rapid restoration priority (business critical)?
- Do we involve legal/HR (insider risk suspicion) and/or notify authorities (sector-specific)?
2) Playbook A — Compromised M365 Account (Identity-First)
Objective: Stop attacker access quickly, preserve evidence, and restore secure access.
A1) What this usually looks like (Common Indicators)
- Entra sign-ins from new country/ASN, impossible travel, unfamiliar device.
- MFA prompt bombing / fatigue, or new MFA method added.
- New OAuth app consent granted, suspicious enterprise application.
- Mailbox forwarding enabled, new inbox rules created.
- SharePoint/OneDrive downloads spike after sign-in.
- Defender for Endpoint alert on the user’s primary device shortly before/after suspicious sign-in.
A2) Information to collect immediately (Triage Inputs)
- Affected user: UPN, display name, department, and whether they are privileged.
- Timeframe: Approximate time window of suspected compromise.
- Artifacts: Known phishing email, URL, or attachment (if available).
- Business impact: Access loss tolerance, critical mailboxes/data.
- Primary device(s): Hostname, Intune-managed yes/no.
A3) First 30 Minutes Checklist (Containment)
Open incident record (ticket) and note: time, reporter, suspected scope.
Entra: Revoke active sessions/refresh tokens for the user.
Entra: Disable account temporarily (if SEV1 or privileged).
Entra: Reset password and require password change at next sign-in.
MFA: Remove suspicious MFA methods; re-register with user on trusted device.
Conditional Access: Apply restrictions (Require MFA, Compliant Device, Block Legacy Auth, Risk-based).
Defender for Endpoint: Check for alerts; isolate device if suspicious (SEV1).
A4) Investigation Steps (Practical Path)
- Entra Review: Identify first suspicious sign-in, device, IP, location, and client app.
- Risk Signals (P2): Check sign-in/user risk; confirm if risk policies triggered.
- Auth Methods: Confirm if MFA methods were added/changed.
- OAuth Persistence: Review consent grants; remove suspicious enterprise apps; invalidate tokens.
- Mailbox Persistence: Check forwarding, inbox rules, delegates, and suspicious send activity.
- Endpoint Correlation: Validate device for malware, token theft, or suspicious browser activity.
A5) Eradication + Recovery
- Remove malicious rules/forwarding and unauthorized delegates.
- Remove suspicious app consents and rotate any exposed credentials.
- If endpoint involved: Remediate device (Defender actions) before restoring access.
- Re-enable user with verified MFA and device compliance enforced.
- Monitor (24–72h): Sign-ins, mailbox rules, and unusual downloads/sharing.
A6) Post-incident Hardening (Recommended)
- CA Baseline: MFA, block legacy auth, require compliant device for high-risk apps.
- Privileged Access: PIM, least privilege, separate admin accounts.
- Phishing-resistant MFA for admins where feasible.
3) Playbook B — Suspicious Mailbox Activity / BEC
Objective: Stop business email compromise patterns and prevent ongoing fraud.
B1) What this usually looks like
- Hidden inbox rules moving finance emails to RSS/Archive.
- External forwarding to unknown domains.
- Impersonation attempts (CEO/CFO), invoice fraud attempts.
- Unusual sent items volume or replies to old threads.
- Defender for Office alerts: phish delivered, user clicked, or malicious URL.
B2) First 30 Minutes Checklist
Confirm whether the mailbox is actively sending malicious emails.
Remove/disable external forwarding and suspicious inbox rules.
Revoke sessions and reset credentials (execute Playbook A in parallel).
Finance: Notify finance lead immediately and freeze payment changes.
B3) Investigation Steps (Using Defender for Office P2)
- Use Threat Explorer / Email & Collaboration to identify original phish, recipients, and clickers.
- Review mailbox rules, forwarding, and delegates.
- Review Entra sign-ins for the affected user.
- Blast Radius: Identify other mailboxes with similar rules or patterns.
B4) Tenant-wide Actions
- Search and remove/purge messages across mailboxes (where permitted).
- Block sender/domain/URL patterns.
- Consider temporary tightening of anti-phishing policies for high-risk users.
B5) Recovery + Customer Guidance
- Confirm legitimate rules are restored.
- Finance Guidance: Verify bank changes out-of-band, confirm invoices via phone, treat "urgent" requests as suspicious.
4) Playbook C — Data Leakage / Suspected Exfiltration
Objective: Stop risky sharing, preserve evidence, and assess scope quickly.
C1) What this usually looks like
- Anonymous links created for sensitive folders.
- External guest access added unexpectedly.
- Large download activity from OneDrive/SharePoint.
- Teams channel files shared externally.
- Purview alerts: DLP policy matches, unusual sharing.
C2) First 30 Minutes Checklist
Identify exact location (site/OneDrive/Team) and sensitivity of data.
Preserve evidence: Note time window, user(s), file(s), link(s).
Remove/expire anonymous links and restrict external sharing.
If identity compromise is suspected: Execute Playbook A in parallel.
C3) Investigation Steps (Purview/Audit-driven)
- Review audit events: link creation, guest invitations, file downloads/access, permission changes.
- Identify which files were accessed and by whom.
- Determine if access was legitimate business activity vs. suspicious.
C4) Recovery + Governance Improvements
- Restore sharing to least privilege.
- Implement/adjust Sensitivity Labels and DLP policies.
- Set external sharing baseline per sector (finance/pharma/public).
- Add alerting for high-risk sharing behaviors.
5) Evidence, Communications, and Closure Package
5.1 Evidence Handling
- Timeline: Detection ? Containment ? Eradication ? Recovery.
- Artifacts: Sign-in evidence, rule changes, sharing links, app consents, endpoint remediation actions.
- Approvals: Document who approved high-impact actions (account disable, tenant-wide blocks).
5.2 Customer Communication Templates
Initial Acknowledgement:
Summary of what is known
Immediate actions underway
What is needed from the customer (approvals, contacts, business impact)
Containment Update:
Actions taken and expected user impact
Current risk status and next steps
Closure Summary:
Timeline
Root cause hypothesis
Confirmed impact (what was accessed/changed)
Hardening actions completed and recommended follow-ups
5.3 Recommended Update Cadence
- SEV1: Every 60–90 minutes until contained.
- SEV2: Twice daily until stable.
- SEV3: Daily or at milestones.